What is academic freedom? To whom does it apply and where? What is its purpose and scope? What are its limits, and who determines its boundaries? Are academic freedom and the First Amendment right of “freedom of speech” identical concepts? If not, how are they related?
These questions are probed by Daniel Gordon, professor of history at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, in his recent book, What is Academic Freedom? A Century of Debate–1915 to the Present (Routledge, 2022.). It is not possible in one short review to do justice to this excellent study. I can present only a very compressed summary of the book and draw attention to a few things I learned from reading it.
It pains me to omit so many fascinating stories, authors, and issues addressed in this book: the case of Angela Davis (1969/70), which turned on the question, “Can the Regents of the University of California fire a professor for being a communist?” Or the story of Steven Salaita, which forced the courts to deal with the question, “Can an offer of academic employment be rescinded because of a candidate’s past anti-Israel statements?” What about the work of Stanley Fish on academic freedom, the thought of Alexander Meiklejohn on the absolute nature of freedom of speech, or Edward Said’s study of academic freedom and the politicization of the study of literature? And so many more!
The Current Debate
The current controversies about the presence of Marxism, Critical Race Theory, gender theory, and other forms of “radical indoctrination” in American colleges and universities were initiated in 2003 by David Horowitz. Horowitz began a campaign to get state legislatures to ban (mainly) Marxist indoctrination from university classrooms by adopting the Academic Bill of Rights (ABOR) into state law. Horowitz received support from dozens of state legislators and got huge pushback from such academic societies as the American Association of University Professors. His campaign sought to protect academic freedom for politically conservative professors-–a beleaguered minority within higher education—and to protect students from coercion or intimidation by left-leaning, activist professors. In response to Horowitz, defenders of activist professors and politicized classrooms asserted the right to teach their views. Both sides appealed to academic freedom. The debate continues today and promises to intensify as the 2024 campaign season progresses.
The genius of Gordon’s book is its historical explanation of how the concept of academic freedom came to be understood in such dramatically different ways. I will focus on Gordon’s documentation of three historical changes that profoundly affect contemporary discussions of academic freedom.
The American Association of University Professors
In 1915, Arthur Lovejoy and others founded the American Association of University Professors. In view of the continuing push toward the professionalization of the American professoriate, to forestall government interference, and to prevent censorship of teaching and publication, Lovejoy wrote the 1915 AAUP General Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. The Declaration asserts the right of professors to explore issues within their disciplinary expertise with great latitude in service to their noble calling. However, it warns against using the classroom to “indoctrinate” (Lovejoy’s word) young students with the opinions of the professor, especially with partisan political views on issues of current social concern. Additionally, the original 1915 Declaration urges professors to exercise care in non-academic settings. Lovejoy cautions, “In their extramural utterances, it is obvious that academic teachers are under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or exaggerated statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational modes of expression.”
By 2006, however, the AAUP had renounced its opposition to politicizing the classroom. Cary Nelson, AAUP president between 2006 to 2012, became the chief opponent of the Horowitz project. However, long before the AAUP got on board, most American universities had already modified their understanding of academic freedom. The shift began in the 1960s with the founding of programs in Black Studies, Cultural Studies, Women’s Studies, and other identity-group studies. These programs were from the very beginning unapologetic advocacy groups. By the 1990s postmodernism, inspired particularly by Michel Foucault, had convinced many academics that all speech is political. According to postmodernism, those who claim scientific neutrality or objectivity merely hide the power structures that favor their class interests. Today, two visions of academic freedom compete for dominance, the postmodern activist and the anti-political professional view.
Freedom of Speech
A second historical transformation I had not fully understood before I read Gordon’s book is the change in the jurisprudence of free speech. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution addresses the right of speech: “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech….” Originally, this restriction applied to the federal government only. States were free to enact their own bills of rights and laws concerning, among other things, speech. After the Civil War, the United States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution (1868). It begins, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States….” The bolded lines are taken today as applying to the states all the rights of the citizen listed in the Federal Constitution. I was unaware that it took the Supreme Court until well into the twentieth century to apply “freedom of speech” to the states.
Additionally, I did not understand the evolution in the federal judiciary’s understanding of the conditions that justify imposing restrictions on speech. Until the early twentieth century, the courts agreed that speech that tended to create unrest or might reasonably be thought to do so was not protected by the First Amendment. In the 1919 case Schenck v. United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, articulated the “clear and present danger” test for when the government may limit the exercise of speech. In the 1969 Brandenburg v. Ohio case, however, the Supreme Court replaced the “clear and present danger” test with the “imminent lawless action” test. As is clear, the conditions under which speech may be limited by a government entity became more restrictive as the century unfolded. Correspondingly, the scope of free speech was expanded exponentially.
The Fusion of Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech
Before the 1960s, academic freedom was distinguished from the constitutional right to freedom of speech. Academic freedom was considered a special freedom to teach based on the unique calling and qualifications of the professor, the nature of academia, and the special role of the university in society. One can see this distinction clearly in the 1915 AAUP General Principles of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. In public spaces, controversies over speech rights were focused on political and commercial issues. In the 1915 statement, those activities were excluded from the classroom as inappropriate to the profession. Moreover, as we saw in the previous section on the history of free speech, until the 1960s, government entities at all levels could restrict speech for a number of reasons. Hence before that time, appealing to the right of free speech in an academic setting would not have helped one’s case. Moreover, appealing to the First Amendment to protect academic speech would in effect surrender the special status of teaching as a profession and place it on the same level as a political rant or an advertisement for soap.
But within the last 50 years, the courts, the professoriate, and the public have come to assimilate academic freedom to freedom of speech. And since the courts now protect even the most outrageous and radical forms of speech, activist professors that wish to use such speech in the classroom increasingly appeal to the First Amendment to protect their right to say whatever they wish in the classroom: political tirades, recruitment drives, and vitriolic, personal attacks on religious and political leaders.
Academic Freedom in Christian Colleges
Though Gordon’s book deals with state educational institutions only, I believe it can be helpful in grappling with academic freedom in Christian colleges. I hope to address this subject in a follow-up essay, but let me tell you briefly what I mean: (1) Gordon explodes the idea that there is an authoritative definition of academic freedom that must be implemented in every institution that claims to be true to the nature of the academic vocation. Christian colleges, then, should be free to define academic freedom in a way that fits their mission. (2) Debunking the idea that academic freedom must be subsumed under the more general concept of freedom of speech will help Christian colleges resist encroachments by governments, accrediting bodies, and rogue professors that work against the Christian mission of the college.
Ron Highfield, Professor
Religion & Philosophy Division
Seaver College
Pepperdine University
